

JFACC AIR OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE OPERATION ACTIVE RESOLVE 2 D+1

1. SITUATION

a. JFC quidance (verbatim).

Deploy forces to the region, building situational awareness (SA) of the situation and defend Turkey against Syrian aggression.

Set conditions for CJTF land offensive into Syrian to destroy Syrian offensive capability.

b. Enemy situation.

The current enemy situation is defined in VIS INTSUM D0, available at OPAR BRIEF.

c. Friendly situation (by joint force component).

IV Corps is preparing for combat operations.

55th Mech Division: Moving in to secure HATAY.

56th Armored Division: Preparing for Division offensive toward Gazientiep on D4.

Turkish local forces

Screening battalion NORTHWEST Gazintiep: N35 27.000 E038 20.000

Screening battalion WEST Gazintiep: N37 09.000 E039 46.000

2. MISSION - The JFACC's mission statement (verbatim).

JFACC will establish air superiority in the area of operations and defeat Syrian offensive capability in support of CJTF-82 offensive operations to neutralize Syrian offensive capability to conduct offensives in the region.

3. EXECUTION - AIR OPERATIONS

JFACC's Intent	JFACC's intent throughout this phase is to provide airborne assets in order to achieve air superiority in Turkish airspace, such that Syrian aggression into this airspace is prevented.
	Further, it is intended that support be provided to friendly ground forces through the availability of air-to-ground strike aircraft, performing a variety of missions throughout the AO.

DISCLAIMER:

1) Purpose	 When circumstances permit, JFACC intends to conduct a series of aggressive air interdiction sorties, aimed at disrupting logistical, command and manufacturing assets, preventing further Syrian aggression into Turkey. The purpose of such operations is four-fold: To shape the AO such that a permissive environment is provided for the conduct of further air sorties. To deny Syrian armed forces the use of the air in order to aggress friendly ground forces, or prevent the use of friendly air assets against Syrian ground forces. To inhibit the ability for Syrian forces to wage war. To provide direct support to friendly ground forces by attempting to attrit enemy ground forces.
2) End State	The desired end state of these operations is one in which Syrian forces have been expelled from Turkey, with respect to both ground and air forces.
Execution What to do, when. – Any detailed instructions if needed	Air operations on D1 will be focused on ensuring that the safety of friendly forces is not compromised, whilst seizing the initiative by conducting aggressive air interdiction sorties against TAFTANAZ airbase.
	Air operations on D1 will be split into two groups. The first sally of sorties is intended to maximise the destruction of Syrian forces aggressing HATAY AB in protection of friendly forces, whilst destroying Syrian SAM assets. The destruction of Syrian SAM assets IVO TAFTANAZ aims to produce a permissive environment for subsequent sorties on D1 to destroy the Syrian 2 nd Corps HQ, located IVO TAFTANAZ.
Focus of effort by	Two key areas are addressed by this ATO:
objective	Defend HATAY AB: VIS assesses that Syrian forces are encroaching on HATAY AB and given that friendly air assets are based at HATAY, the security of HATAY must be ensured. This is considered a critical objective and should be prioritised by C2 assets, re-tasking sorties as required to support the objective.
	SAM, SHORAD and Artillery assets should be prioritised in the defense of HATAY; the destruction of SAM and SHORAD will create permissive environment for further sorties, whilst Artillery assets prove the biggest threat to HATAY.
	Strike TAFTANAZ: The Syrian 2 nd Corps are staging at TAFTANAZ AB and JFACC intends to seize initiative early in the campaign by striking resources at TAFTANAZ before they have the opportunity to disperse throughout the battlespace.
Allocation of sorties (in percent)	CAP – 20% - CAP sorties will be launched to protect friendly forces from any aggression by Syrian Air Force assets
- CAS, AR, AI,DCA, OCA (SEAD is part	SEAD/DEAD - 30% - Sorties will be launched in support of friendly
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	-
of OCA)	forces conducting other operations, and to proactively prosecute SAM assets within the area of operations.
	AD 200/ Cartias would be lounghed to conduct urgant Armed
	AR – 20% - Sorties would be launched to conduct urgent Armed
	Reconnaissance along the MSRs leading towards the Turkish border
	with Syria to locate and prosecute Syrian 2 nd Corps assets.
	Al – 30% - Resources should be committed to the attrition of Syrian
	2 nd Corps assets IVO Taftanaz.
Acceptable level of	Tolerance of risk should be minimal in the execution of these missions
risk. (including for	- CJTF ground forces are currently not engaged in conflict and there
AWACS and	should be no desire to unnecessarily persecute enemy forces in the
tankers: forward or	execution of these missions.
rear)	
Collateral damage	Every attempt should be taken to minimise collateral damage in the
and civilian	execution of these missions. Civilian casualties should be avoided at
casualty guidance	all costs.
casualty guidance	all COStS.
	Suspected civilian casualties should be reported through the C2
	network as soon as is practicable.
TST guidance	Should opportunities present, items from the TST matrix should be
101 galdance	prosecuted. The outcome should be reported to the relevant C2
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Intelligence	agency.
Intelligence,	All notifications of enemy air defence assets – ground- and air-based
Surveillance,	- must be reported as soon as is practicable. Reports should, where
Reconnaissance	possible, include the observing aircraft's currently position, a relative
(ISR) – If any effort	bearing to the threat and the type of threat.
should be done to	
support VIS with	No specific ISR tasking are planned for this mission.
ISR to answer	
information gaps	At all times, intelligence should be reported promptly by air crews via
from VIS.	the In-Flight Report Net, such that intelligence can be collated by VIS
	in support of the campaign.
	in dapport of the dampaign.
	All intelligence and BDA should be submitted via Campaign
	Manager, and necessary images placed in the '#bda-reports on
	discord IAW SPINS.
Othersteen	
Other issues	N/A
Direction and	Aircrews must remain clear of Jordanian airspace at all times.
Guidance	Munitions must not be expended which may encroach on Jordanian
	airspace.
1	Aircrew should exercise caution expending munitions in the direction
	of Basel Al-Assad and Tartarus, such that Russian forces are not
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	brought into the conflict.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Due to other ongoing major military operations, the following munitions are limited at the following counts as of the start of D1:

Current limitations on ammunition:

- AGM-84D (Harpoon): **50** (F/A-18)
- AGM-84E (SLAM): 10 (F/A-18)
- AGM-84H (SLAM ER): **6** (F/A-18)
- AGM-154A: **15** (F/A-18, F-16)
- AGM-154C: **6** (F/A-18)
- GBU-31(V) 3/B (Bunker buster): 10 (F/A-18, F-16, A-10)
- GBU-31: **20** (F/A-18, F-16, A-10)
- GBU-32: **15** (F/A-18)
- GBU-38: **50** (F/A-18, F-16, A-10)
- GBU-54: 20 (A-10)
- GBU-10: **15** (F/A-18, F-14, F-16, A-10)
- GBU-12: 50 (F/A-18, F-14, F-16, A-10)
- GBU-16: 0 (F/A-18, F-14)
- GBU-24: **15** (F/A-18, F-14)

All aircrew must report the expenditure of any munitions in their after action reports.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

There are no known, specific C2 considerations for these missions. Refer to the Command, Control and Communications section of the JAOP.